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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-~------------------~---~~-~~~

BRUCE MICHAEL LARNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18065

MARY LYNN HILL, formerly,
MARY LYNN LARNER,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
In the action below the Third Judicial DistrictCourt in and for Salt Lake County was requested to grant
full faith and credit to a Colorado court decree of dissolution
of marriage and to then modify that decree, and grant custody
of three minor children to the Plaintiff.

The Defendant-

Appellant objected to the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake
County District Court; the Court overruled that objection.
The Defendant-Appellant petitioned this Court for
an interlocutory appeal.

That petition was granted to

-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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consider whether the Third Judicial District Court has
jurisdiction to modify the Colorado decree with regard to
child custody.

II.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Hon. Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., judge presiding,
overruled the Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Object to
Jurisdiction, granted full faith and credit to the Colorado
Decree of Dissolution, granted temporary custody of two of
the

~hree

minor children to the Plaintiff and ruled that the

Utah Court had the jurisdiction to modify the Colorado
decree with regard to the custody of only the two minor
children who had been residing in Utah for more than one
year.

III.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Respondent requests this Court to
affirm the decision of the Court below taking jurisdiction
over two of the minor children and remand the case for a
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hearing on the merits of Plaintiff's petition to modify the
Colorado Decree.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were divorced

~n

Colorado in March 1980 with joint custody of three minor
children being granted the parties.

Originally under the-·

decree, physical custody of two of the chilren, Stephen
Michael and Joseph Scott was granted to the Defendant,
living in Colorado, and physical custody of the daughter,
.Julianne Michelle was granted to the Plaintiff living in
- Utah.

By oral agreement of the parties, the child Stephen

_moved to Utah from Colorado in 1980 and lived in the Plainti£f's
·home for approximately one year prior to the filing. of the
Plaintiff's

complaint to modify the Colorado decree.

In July 1981 the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court seeking a Modification of
the Colorado decree to grant full custody of all three minor
children to him.

The Defendant was served with that Complaint

in Colorado, and through Salt Lake counsel filed a Special
Appearance and a Motion to Object to Jurisdiction contesting
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the jurisdiction of the Utah court to modify the decree.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for Temporary
Order asking for an Order granting temporary custody of the
three minor children to the Plaintiff pending a full hearing
and resolution of the case on its merits.

That motion,

and notice of the hearing, was served upon the Defendant's
Utah counsel by mail and was heard by the Court, the Hon.
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding, on August 25, 1981.

An

Order was entered October 1, 1981 granting full faith and
credit to the Colorado decree and granting temporary full
custody of two of the minor children, Stephen Michael and
Julianne Michelle, to the Plaintiff and ruling that ''in all
other respects the Colorado Decree shall remain in full
force and effect . . . "

The third child was left in the

custody of the mother and returned to Colorado.
On October 1, 1981, at the request of the Plaintiff's
counsel, the Motion of the Defendant to Object to Jurisdiction
was heard by the Court, the Hon. Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.
presiding.

The Court overruled that Motion and entered an

Order on October 16, 1981 to that effect and directiug that
a custody evaluation be performed.
The Defendant appeals from the Orders of the Court
temporarily granting full custody of two of the minor children
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to the Plaintiff and denying the Defendant's objection to

jurisdiction.

v.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No oral evidence was presented to the Court at
either of the hearings on August 25, 1981 or October l,
19.81.

Prior to the Court's ruling, the Defendant-submitted

_no evidence as to the facts of the case or facts regarding
the Defendant's objection to jurisdiction.

The only evidence

bef_or_e the Court was that presented by the verified Complaint
of the Plaintiff dated July 1, 1981 with the attached Colorado
Decree (T.R. pp 2=17).

Based upon that verified Complaint

the following are the uncontroverted facts upon which the
Court entered its Orders.
The Plaintiff, Bruce Larner, is a resident of Salt
Lake County and the State of Utah.

The Defendant, Mary Lynn

Hill formerly Mary Lynn Larner, is a resident of the State
of Colorado.

(T.R. p. 2)

The Piaintif f and the Defendant were formerly
husband and wife.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered on March 17, 1980
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by the District Court in and for the County of Jefferson and
the State of Colorado, Civil Action No. 79 DR 2067. (T.R.
p. 2)

The Plaintiff and the Defendant are the parents of
three minor children:

Stephen Michael Larner, born March

13, 1968; Julianne Michelle Larner,

bo~rri

Joseph Scott Larner, born May 29, 1972.

May 10, 1969; and
(T.R. p. 2)

Pursuant to the Decree of Dissolution, the parties
exercised joint custody over their minor children since the
entry of the Decree.

The parties initially agreed that

physical care, custody and control of Stephen Michael Larner
and Joseph Scott Larner was to be granted to the Defendant
herein, and that physical care, custody and control of
Julianne Michelle Larner was to be granted to the Plaintiff
herein.

(T.R. pp. 2-3)
The parties agreed in July, 1980 that physical

care, custody and control of the minor child Stephen Michael
Larner would be transferred to the Plaintiff.
1980 said

Since July,

minor child has resided with the Plaintiff in Salt

Lake City, Utah.
All three minor children were, in July 1981.
residing with the Plaintiff Bruce Michael Larner in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

(T.R. p. 3)

The child Joseph Scott was
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then domiciled in Colorado; the other two were domiciled in
Utah.
The Defendant Mary Lynn Hill was in the near
future going to move from Colorado to the mid-West, and
therefore there would be problems resulting from the separation
of the children and problems with regard to visitation
between the parties and the minor children.

(T.R. p. 3)

Since the divorce of the parties, the Plaintiff
herein had re-married and had established a home and residence
in Salt Lake City, Utah such that he could adequately and
fully care for all three minor children of the parties.

The

Plaintiff's current spouse was willing, able and anxious to
assist the Plaintiff in caring for and assuming full custody
of the three minor children of the Plaintiff.

(T.R. p. 3)

Plaintiff alleged that in order for the three
minor children to grow and develop as a family unit and to
relate and interact with each other, it was in the best
interest of the children that they not be separated and
reside in far distant different states, but tha.t physical
custody of all three children be placed with the Plaintiff.
He alleged it was reasonable that visitation as set forth in
the Decree of Dissolution be maintained and continued such
that the children could maintain an appropriate relationship
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with their mother.

(T.R. p. 3)

In order to stabilize the situation during the
pendency of the action, the Plaintiff alleged it was reasonable
that the Court enter a temporary order granting full temporary
custody of all three minor children to the Plaintiff until
such time as the trial Court could hear and rule upon the
Complaint and petition for modification. (T.R. p. 4)
There had been a substantial change of circumstances
such that it was appropriate at that time that the Colorado
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage should be modified to
grant full custody, care and control of the minor children
to the Plaintiff, terminating any obligation of the Plaintiff
to pay child support and granting the Defendant visitation
rights as set forth in the original Decree.

(T.R. p. 4)

The Colorado Decree of Dissolution contained the
following pertinent provisions with regard to child custody
and visitation:
Due to the state discrepancies of the residences
of the parties, the Husband residing and domiciling
in Utah, and the Wife residing and domiciling in
Colorado, and because of the current desires of the
minor children of the parties, and the desire of
the parents to alleviate the emotional trauma of
divorce with the children, the parents agree to
exercise joint custody over said minor children.
Provided, however, that until such time as the
parties should agree otherwise, or until further
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order of this Court, the Wife shall have the
physical care, custody and control of Stephen
Michael Larner and Joseph Scott Larner, and the
Hu~band shall have the physical care, custody
and control of Julianne Michelle Larner.
(T . R. pp . 7 - 8)
Each non-custodial parent of the children
of the parties shall be entitled to a minimum of
twelve (12) non-specified days each month visitation
privileges. Provided, however, that all costs of
transportation to and from the non-custodial parent
shall be borne by that parent. And provided further,
however,·that the non-custodial parent notify the
custodial parent forty-eight (48) hours prior to the
exercise of visitation as to the intent of the
visitation. The parties further agree and recognize
that the minor children would benefit greatly from
each other's presence and the parents agree to_
make all reasonable efforts to insure that all-_
three (3) minor children are together on theirrespective birthdays, on major holidays, and during
periods of school vacation periods (including the
summer months). The non=custodial parent shall
have the right to take the minor children out of
state, or out of the country during visitation
periods, so long as the custodial parent has been
properly notified, and a basic itinerary of said
trip has been furnished the custodial parent. At
no time shall either parent exercise visitation
which shall hinder the education of the minor
children of the parties. (T.R. p. 8)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANY DEFECTS IN NOTICE DID NOT DEPRIVE
THE COURT OF JURISDICTION
The Defendant alleges that the hearing upon the
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Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary order was improper in
that there was not ten days notice given under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.A. §78-45c-5, 1953), and
there was not eight days notice given under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (Rule 6(d) & 6(e)).

The Defendant

further objects that a motion seeking a temporary order
should have been on the trial calendar and not on the order
to show cause calendar pursuant to Local Rule 4(h) of the
Third Judicial District Court.
These objections do not go to the jurisdiction of
the Court, but are minor procedural matters.
On July 13, 1981 the Defendant, Mary Lynn Hill
formerly Larner, was personally served with the Plaintiff's
Complaint and Summons.

(T.R. p. 22)

That Complaint in part

requested that the Third Judicial District Court "issue a
temporary order granting full custody of the three minor
children to the Plaintiff during the pendency of this action,
subject to the reasonable visitation rights of the Defendant
as provided in the original Decree."

(T.R. p. 4)

On July 13, 1981 the Defendant was personally
served with an Order to Show 'Cause (T.R. p. 20) directing
her to appear before the Third District Court on July 23,
1981 to consider the Plaintiff's request for an order granting
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temporary custody of the three minor children to the Plaintiff
during the pendency of the action.
The Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was dismissed
on July 23, 1981 at the insistence of the Defendant's counsel
because the Defendant had not received ten (10) days notice
of that hearing pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45c-5 (1953 as amended).
(T.R. pp. 27-28).
Defendant's counsel was mailed notice on August J ,1981 that a hearing was to be held on August 25, 1981 on the
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking temporary custody.
(T.R. p. 29)

That notice was also mailed to the Defendant

in Colorado on August 3, 1981.

(T.R. p. 29)

On August 19, 1981 the Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Temporary Order seeking custody of the three mino·r
children.

(T.R. pp. 30-31)

That Motion sought the same

temporary relief as Plaintiff sought in the Complaint and in
the Order to Show Cause.

Notice of the hearing on the

Motion for Temporary Custody was also mailed to Defendant's
Counsel on August 19, 1981.

(T.R. pp. 30-31)

her counsel appeared on August 25, 1981.

Defendant and

·(T. R. p. 98)

Clearly the Defendant and her counsel ha.d actual notice of
the matter of temporary custody being brought before the
Court on August 25, 1981 in compliance with U.C.A., §78-
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45c-5(1) 1953.

The focus of that section is on notice in a

manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice.
This Court has previously ruled that the time
limits of Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
not cast in stone but may be dispensed with in appropriate
cases.
Plaintiff was entitled to a fair notice and an
effective opportunity to controvert any facts adduced
in support of defendant's motion. The five-day
provision of Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P. is not a hard and
fast rule, and the trial court may dispense with
technical compliance thereof if there be satisfactory
proof that a party had actual notice and time to prepare
to meet the questions raised by the motion of an
adversary.
Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236, 238, citing Marshal
Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization,
Inc. (CA 5th, 1971), 445 F.2d 353, 358.
See also, Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir.
1958).
The Appellant makes no claim that she was in any
way prejudiced by the inadequacy of time to prepare. Any
such prejudice is not apparent from the record which indicates
that the Appellant knew for six and a half weeks prior to
the hearing that the Respondent sought an order granting him
temporary custody.
Matters of child custody to be heard under the
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.A. §78-45c-
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24, 1953) are to be given calendar priority and handled
expeditiously.
The Appellant cites Rule 4 of the Local Rules of
the Third Judicial District Court, effective July 1, 1981
for the proposition that the Order to Show Cause calendar
may be used only for enforcement purposes, and claims that a
motion seeking a temporary custody ox·cer should have been on
the trial calendar.
The Appellant is in error as to the usage of
Orders to Show Cause on the Domestic Relations calendar of
the Salt Lake County Third Judicial District Court.

Orders

to Show Cause are routinely used to secure temporary orders
·:.in domestic relations matters for temporary custody, temporary ..
child support and alimony, restraining orders, etc.

Those

are not enforcement matters, but prospective temporary
relief.

The Order to Show Cause calendar is the domestic

relations law and motion calendar.

Under the Appellant's

interpretation of Local Rule 4, litigants would be precluded
from using the Order to Show Cause calendar to secure temporary
relief in pending divorce actions.
The Plaintiff had set a trial date on the Complaint
for a full hearing on its merits for December 9, 1981 but
sought temporary relief by way of a custody order pending
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that hearing and trial.

The only available forum was the

Domestic Relations Law and Motion and Order to Show Cause
1
calendar.
Any errors of the Court below with regard to the
notice given or the court calendar are minor procedural
matters which do not go to the question of jurisdiction.
Those are harmless errors and are not errors that this Court
should review unless prejudice resulted.

This Court granted

Appellant's petition for an interlocutory appeal to consider
a question regarding

jurisdiction, not minor technical

proedural errors.
The Appellant had sufficient notice of the proceedings
and the temporary relief sought by the Plaintiff such that
the Appellant cannot claim any prejudice or denial of due
process.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done ·or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a
1
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for orders
to show cause; although used thoughcut the state court system,
orders to show cause appear to have developed and are used
differently in each judicial district. Local Rule 4 of the
Third District Court is an attempt to give some direction and
regulate the use of orders to show cause in domestic relations
matters in that district. Respondent's counsel would urge this
Court to consider adopting uniform state rules for the use and
issuance of orders to show cause.
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new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
(Rule 61)
The Appellant makes no claim that the conduct of
the Court below in hearing the matter when and how it did
was "inconsistent with substantial justice" nor tha.t it
affected "the substantial rights of the parties."
The burden is on the Appellant to show that the
error was prejudicial to her case.

Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 249

P.2d 514, 518 (1952); see also, Bell vs. Swift & Co., 283
F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1960).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in
considering the question of harmless error:
A lawsuit is not so rule-bound that one side wins
whenever the other side breaks a rule. To succeed
in an appeal based on an infraction of the rules,
the appellant must show that the infraction was
a substantial error prejudicing the appellant's
case.
Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 408 (1960)
The Appellant has neither alleged nor shown any
prejudice resulting from the notice or calendar problem, and
both claims should be dismissed as harmless error.
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POINT II
APPELLANT PRESENTED NO FACTS
OR EVIDENCE TO THE COURT BELOW
The Appellant alleges that the Court below acted
based "on minimal facts" making a "precipitous decision."
When the Court ruled upon the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary
Custody and upon the Defendant's Motion to Object to Jurisdiction
the only evidence before the Court was the Verified Complaint
of the Plaintiff.
The Appellant had been personally served with a
copy of the verified Complaint on July 13, 1981 and had
ample opportunity prior to the August 25th and October 1st
hearings to respond with evidence but chose not to do so.
After the Court made its oral ruling during the
hearing of October 1, 1981 counsel for the Appellant then
requested that the Court withhold a ruling and allow him to
submit evidence by way of an affidavit.

At the time the

Appellant's Motion to Object to Jurisdiction had been pending
more than two months

(T.R. p. 25); the court declined to

allow the submission of additional evidence after it had
already made its ruling.

(T.R. p. 125)

The Appellant claims that the Court below acted
precipitously and on minimal facts in deciding that the Utah
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court had jurisdiction over the two older minor children.
That same decision included a determination that the Utah
court did not have jurisdiction over the youngest child,
Joseph Scott.

The facts were obviously sufficient and the

decision non-precipitous with regard to that child for we d
not hear the Appellant complain about the decision to decline
jurisdiction.
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
provides for expedited hearings when there is a question of
jurisdiction (U.C.A. §78-45c-24, 1953 as amended).

Rather

_ than expediting matters and resolving the issue of jurisdiction,
however

1

the Appellant did not request a hearing in the

- Court below on her Motion to Object to Jurisdiction.

The

_matter was heard only upon the insistence of the-Plaintiff's
counsel. (T.R. p. 33)
The Appellant objected to jurisdiction but failed
to present any evidence with regard to jurisdiction and
failed to notice her objection for hearing before the Court.
It appears that the Motion to Object to Jurisdiction was
interposed for the purpose of delaying the filing of an
answer to allow the appellant to commence a second action in
Colorado and not to seriously challenge the jurisdiction of
the Court.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ACTED WITHIN THE PURPOSE
AND POLICY, LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE UTAH
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
(hereinafter called the "UUCCJA" or the "Act"), U.C.A. §7845c-14, (1953) provides as follows:
"(l) If a court of anothe'!:' state has
made a custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree, unless (a) it appears to
the court of this state that the court which
rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction
under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially
in accordance with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The threshold question is, "Did it appear to the
Court below that the Colorado court did not have jurisdiction
under the jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in
accordance with the UUCCJA?"

If it appeared Colorado had

jurisdiction, then the mandatory langue.ge of U.C.A. §78-45c14 (1953) applies; but if it appeared that Colorado did not
have jurisdiction under those jurisdictional prerequisites,
then the Third Judicial District Court was proper and correct
in taking jurisdiction.
What are the "jurisdictional prerequisites substantially
in accordance with this act" such the.t Colorado no longer
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has jurisdiction and Utah has jurisdiction?

We must look to

the applicable sections of the act:
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide
child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a
child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the
following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii)
had been the child's home state within six months
before commencement of the proceeding. . .
(b) If it is in the best interest of the child
that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at
least one contestant, have a significant connection
with this state, and (ii) there is available in this
state substantial evidence concering the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.
U.C.A. §78-45c-3 (1953)
The term "home state" as used in the foregoing section is
defined as:
the state in which the child itmnediately preceding
the time involved lived with tis parents, a parent
or a person acting as parent, for at least six
consecutive months. . . U. C .·A. §78-45c-2 (5) 1953.
Did the Colorado court in July or August 1981 have the
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance
with the Utah Statute?

The evidence presented to the trial

court clearly shows that Judge Baldwin properly ruled that
Colorado did not retain jurisdiction.
Utah was the "home state" for Stephen Michael and
Julianne Michelle; they had lived in Utah for more tha.n the
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required six months, actually more than one year.
2-3)

(T.R. pp.

Colorado was not their "home state". Thus, Colorado

did not have jurisdiction over the two oldest children under
Subsection (a) of U.C.A. 78-45c-3 (1) (1953).
Neither did Colorado have jurisdiction over the
two older children under Subsection (b) of that statute.

In

their comments to the equivalent provision in the Uniform
Act, the Uniform Law Commissioners stated:
[This provision] perhaps more than any other provision
of the Act requires that it be interpreted in the
spirit of the legislative purposes expressed in section
1.

9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioners' Notes, at 124 (1979)
Section 1 was enacted in Utah as U.C.A. §78-45c-l (1953).
That section states, in part, that the express purpose of
the UUCCJA is to
assure that litigation concerning the custody of
a child take place ordinarily in the state with
which the child and his family have the closest
connection and where significant evidence
concerning his care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is most readily available.
U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c) (1953 as amended) (emphasis supplied)
The Commissioners further commented as follows:
Jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's
interest, not merely the interest of convenience
of the feuding parties, to determine custody in
a particular state. The interest of the child
is served when the forum has optimum access to
relevant evidence about the child and family. The
submission of the parties to a forum, perhaps for the
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purposes of divorce, is not sufficient without
additional factors establishing closer ties with
the state. 9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioners' Notes at
124 (1979).
'
The facts and evidence presented to the trial court amply
demonstrated that the two children over whom the court
asserted jurisdiction had maximum contact with Utah and
minimum contact with Colorado at the time of the hearing.
The Plaintiff and the two children had been living in
Utah for a significant period of time, over one year.
children were enrolled in school in Utah.

The-

The.Plaintiff's

Complaint established that he had a new wife and home in
Salt Lake City and that his wife was willing, able and
anxious to help care for the minor children.

(T.R. p. 3)

. Tha Plaintiff's Complaint established that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances of the parties.
p .-- 4).

(T.R.

Those changes or a substantial number of them occurred

in Utah.

Obviously, substantial evidence concerning the

present and future care, protection, training and personal
relationships of the children was most readily available in
Utah.
The Court below ordered tha.t a custody evaluation
be performed in Utah (T.R. p. 42).

Inherent in such a

ruling is a finding that there is substantial evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

available in Utah with regard to the best interest of the
minor children.

Indeed, counsel for the Appellant asked the

Court below to order that this Utah performed evaluation be
used in a proceeding in Colorado regarding custody.
pp. 123-124)

(T.R.

Counsel for the Appellant thus conceded that

there was significant evidence available in Utah which was
necessary for the proper determination of custody and the
best interest of the minor children in conformance with the
jurisdictional prerequisites of U.C.A. §78-45c-3(l)(b)(ii)
(1953 as amended).
Since the children and their father had not resided
in Colorado for over one year, it follows that they had a
less significant connection with that state and that there
was far less evidence
that state.
inference.

con~erning

the children available in

There was no evidence countering this compelling
Indeed, the uncontrovered evidence showed that

the Defendant intended to leave Colorado soon, thus eliminating
any significant connection or ties with that state.
The Appellant argues in her brief that the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Utah court violated a policy of
favoring the court that issued the initial decree.

Under

the UUCCJA, however, it is clear that to the extent such a
policy exists, it applies only where the foreign court still
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retains jurisdiction as defined in the Act.

Further, such a

policy is always superceded by and must yield to the Act's
pervasive policy of assuring that adjudications regarding
child custody take place where the best interests of the
child may most readily be ascertained.

U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c)

(1953); 9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioner's .Notes at 124, (1979).
In other jurisdictions that have enacted the
Uniform Act the cases are numerous in which courts have
asserted jurisdiction to modify foreign child custody decrees.
In Settle vs. Settle, 559 P.2d 962 (Ore. 1976),

th~

court

_modified a foreign decree, changing custody of the children
to their mother stating:
the requirement of the availablity of "·substantial
evidence" should be understood to require optimum
access to relevant evidence. It appears tha.t at the
time of the commencment of the proceeding in Oregon,
Indiana, the state from which the children had
been absent for 18 monthsj no longer had optimum
access to relevant evidence. Id. at 966.
Similarly, in Slidell vs. Valentine, 298 N.W. 2d 599 (Iowa
1980), where the child and his mother had been absent for
three years from the state that granted custody to the
father, the court in the "new" state modified the foreign
decree, and granted custody to the mother.
Whether an Iowa court has jurisdiction to
modify an earlier out of state decree turns first
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upon whether that court has lost or declined its
pre-existing jurisdiction.
i'

..k

*

One purpose of the jurisdictional provisions of
the act is to emphasize "maximum, rather than
minimum contact with the state."

*

'i<

i~

William had not lived in Florida for three years,
and the nexus between him and the state of Florida
falls short of the "significant connection" required
for the Florida court to assume jurisdiction under
that alternative. Id. at 602-604.
See also, Grubs vs. Ross, 614 P.2d 1225 (Ore. 1980); Smith
vs. Smith, 594 P.2d 1292 (Ore. 1979); Ellis vs. Nickerson,
604 P.2d 518 (Wash. 1979).

Indeed, many courts have declined

to exercise jurisdiction to modify their own child custody
decrees in favor of other states with which the children or
the parties have established new ties.

See e.g., Schlumpf

vs. Superior Court, County of Trinity, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190
(1978) Clark vs. Superior Court, County of Mendocino, 140
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977).
Thus, the facts and evidence before the court
below indicate that Colorado did not retain jurisdiction
over the two older children under U.C.A 78-45c-3 (1953) to
modify its decree.

Conversely, since Utah was the ''home

state" of these two children and they had maximum contact
with the state of Utah, the court properly asserted its
jurisdiction over them.

There had been a substantial change
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in circumstances and passage of time since the issuance of
the Colorado decree.

With the Defendant's own acquiescence

and approval, the two older children severed their ties with
the state of Colorado and established a significant connection
with the state of Utah.
Using the same jurisdictional prerequisites of
the UUCCJA the court below determined that Colorado did have
jurisdiction over the youngest minor child, Joseph Scott.
Colorado was the home state where that child had been domiciled
for several years; the child had been residing and attending
school in Colorado; there was a significant connection
between Colorado and the child; there was substantial evidence
concerning the child's custody and care available in Colorado.
~herefore,

under U.C.A. §78-45c-3 and §78-45c-14 (1953 as

amended) the Utah court declined jurisdiction.

Neither

party to this action has appealed that decision of the
Court.
Appellant makes mention in her brief of a proceeding
pending in Colorado to modify the Decree of Dissolution and
grant custody of all three minor children to the Appellant.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10)

That proceeding was instituted

by the Appellant in Colorado after the Plaintiff instituted

this action in Utah.

(T.R. pp. 101-102, p. 117)

Such
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action by the Appellant is exactly what the UUCCJA seeks to
prevent--forum shopping, multiple litigation, jurisdictional
competition, etc.

(U.C.A. §78-45c-l, 1953 as amended)

Instead of noticing for hearing her objection to jurisdiction
in the Court below and resolving the matter, the Appellant
interposed the motion, delayed filing an answer and proceeded
in Colorado.
The UUCCJA seeks to avoid competition in matters
of child custody jurisdiction, but the act does not countenance
a court retaining jurisdiction when there are no longer any
significant ties or contacts with that state.

The act

directs that the Court before assuming jurisdiction must
examine certain factors such as where the child has lived,
where the custodial parent has lived, where evidence is
available regarding the child and whether there is significant
connection between the child, the parents and that state.
The Court below examined all of those relevant factors as
presented by the evidence and determined that jurisdiction
was proper in Utah; that action was in compliance with the
letter and the spirit of the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.
Significant purposes of the Uniform Act are to
promote cooperation with the court of other states to the
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end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which
can best decide the case in the interest of the child (U.C.A.
§78-45c-l(b), 1953) and to assure that litigation concerning
a child takes place in the state in which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where significant
evidence concerning the child is most readily available.
(U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c), 1953)
by~the

Those puposes were clearly met

decision and finding of the court below that jurisdiction

over the two oldest children was in Utah.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence presented to the Court
below, the Court was correct in determining that it had
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act because the two minor children involved and their father
the Plaintiff had a closer connection to the state of Utah,
than to the state of Colorado, and because significant
evidence concerning the children and their welfare was more
readily available in Utah.

Under the act there were jurisdictional

prerequisites existant in Utah which no longer existed in
the state of Colorado.
The case should be remanded to the Court below to
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proceed on its merits at a full trial and hearing on the
Plaintiff's Complaint to modify the Colorado Decree of
Dissolution.
DATED this~ day of April, 1982.

BARNARD
for Plaintiff-Respondent
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
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copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Joel Allred,
500 American Savings Building, 61 South Main Street, Salt
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Service on this~day of April, 1982.
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